
Contesting ISIS in Indonesia: Leadership and Ideological Barriers on Radicalism as Foundation to Counterterrorism

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Abstract: Southeast Asia has been considered as a fertile land compared to other regions for terrorism breeding in the world outside Middle East region as the basis of its operation. The Muslim population in Southeast Asia contributes to the vast development of terrorism in the region, specifically ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) as the widest terrorist network. Indonesia, in this context, becomes the common target of the group's expansion due to its large Muslim population as well as its strategic location. However, though ISIS has been infiltrating the country for years and influenced some people with its radical perspective to run *jihād* for establishing global Islamic State, a relatively constant movement has taken place without making any significant progress of recruitment and social leverage. This essay will elaborate the reason why ISIS, though rapidly developed within the country, but can not create an apparent progress for the group regarding the expansion of its extreme ideology to the society. In line with this argument, we found two distinct factors that strain the group's radical teachings, which are leadership and ideological barriers. Leadership lies on the Jokowi's unequivocal policies on counterterrorism which enable the country, and region to some extent, to resist the external threat of ISIS. On the other hand, the group can not deal with the plural Muslim community within the country due to its different ideological perspective on Islam, precisely on *jihād*.

Keywords: ISIS, Radicalism, Counterterrorism, Indonesia

1. Introduction

Indonesia as Muslim-majority country in the world has committed to combat terrorism and suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, especially extreme Islamist groups in Iraq and Syria, as a consequence of signing United Nations Security Council Resolution 2170 [1]. For this phenomenon, Indonesia sees ISIS (or Islamic State) as a current major threat in which the world agreed upon the point that this menace should be combatted together. As this threat becomes a terrifying menace of all people, the global trend then shows the negative sentiment toward Muslims as the religion which then becomes the source of the conflict nowadays. Muslims are perceived to have a connection with the ISIS since the group claims the religious reasons to justify their existence and insurgency to seize the world from the order of the unbelievers with its human-made governmental system such

democracy and change with the Islamic-based order. Therefore, it begins to be a critical situation for Indonesia as this country is majorly populated by Muslims whose among them are moderates and possibly undetected extremists as well as its status as the most democratic country in Southeast Asia.

Zachary Abuza, an expert on Southeast Asian militant groups, estimates around 800-1000 Southeast Asian have travelled to Iraq and Syria as both combatants and family members of fighters [2]. On the other side, governments have no certain numbers on how many of their people travelling to Iraq and Syria, but it is evident that some of the people are publicly pledging their allegiance to the ISIS. This state of affairs requires Indonesian government to quickly react to mitigate any further catastrophic effects that the group may possess. For Indonesia, the dangerous of this group is obvious and undeniable. Some of its people travel to Iraq and Syria as the form of their allegiance and supportive manner

of the establishment of the world Caliphate. Interestingly, the government believes that the number of individuals supporting ISIS either by travelling to its base or financially assisting the group is increasing. Additionally, the group also had successfully waking up the sleeping extremist groups within the country by giving inspiration to them to fight against apostasy which their government has performed. Analysts believe that Jakarta attacks, especially Sarinah attacks, though not linked directly to ISIS but were a product of ISIS-inspired attacks that later will raise the Southeast Asian extremist attention to proclaiming war against their legitimate countries [2].

On the other hand, Kurlantzick finds that many experts had noticed that ISIS had created a special brigade of fighters in Indonesia and Malaysia for the past three years [2]. It shows that Indonesia is one of the primary targets of the group since the country is a leading Muslims country with the western style of government which the group later noticed as 'apostasy'. For this issue, then the Indonesian government has formulated several counterterrorism policies and strategies to combat ISIS members internally and impede the external threat. However, among those all, there are two interesting themes of counterterrorism strategies that this essay considers as necessary. National ideology and leadership of the president become the two most important effective ways to tackle terrorism, to some extent, to its roots. These two distinct strategies work differently from each other where national ideology as a non-coercive strategy to resist radical thoughts including extreme Islamic dogma and leadership of the president as the coercive and tangible manifesto of the state to combat terrorism.

This article will develop the argument that ISIS as the largest terrorist group will not easily infiltrate Indonesia by constructing both leadership and ideological institution within the country as barriers for the group to spread its radical values. It is true that ISIS has performed an outrageously vile terror around the world including Indonesia. However, this essay believes that this group fails to exploit the country to raise its fighters and supporters as the two most important factors that the group needs. Fighters as for those who have brave to fight unbelievers and apostates in the battlefield and supporters are those who bolster the network with financial and any means considered as essentials. Since ISIS is the widest and prominent Islamic terrorist group in the world, some might believe that the group can get more from Indonesia as this country is widely known as the common target of a terrorist group for its fertile environment to breed jihadists. On the contrary, this point will be proven wrong with the argument that national ideology and Jokowi's unequivocal policies are significant to combat terrorism.

Jokowi's leadership and eloquent performance become an attractive element of counterterrorism policy in Indonesia in the sense that his soft appearance could generate decisive policies on counterterrorism. On the other hand, ideological factor determines the grass root way of thinking in Islam and its peaceful thoughts. It is related to the presence of

Nahdlatul Ulama and *Muhammadiyah* as the two largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia that have significantly nurture plurality and tolerance among Indonesians with its nationalistic-religious reciprocal dogma, including upholding *Pancasila*, and has supported the government to shape national identity [3]. The spread of this teaching rooted to the very bottom of the society through various techniques. For instance, schools as the fundamental institution in delivering the teaching to all of the organisations' members.

2. Joko Widodo on Counterterror Strategy: Soft Approaches and Firm Policies

Radicalism development in Indonesia concerning post-ISIS establishment could be differentiated into two types. The first one is the radical group who wanted to implement Islamic value with the establishment of the Islamic state in Indonesia. The second one is the radical group who want to implement Islamic value without establishing an Islamic state. As a Muslim-majority country with the population approaching 250 million, Indonesia is relatively under the threat of radical terrorist group affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The historical record of terrorist attacks in Indonesia by the post-9/11 is showing a significant increase. Noted that there was more than 20 deadly terrorist attacks in Indonesia since 9/11. One of the most notable attack was the Bali bombing attack in 2002, whose members were linked with *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI), killed nearly 202 people [4]. By all these attacks, both Indonesian government and people are more aware of the risk of terrorism.

Terrorism is an act of crime which is popular among the people in Indonesia. Sometimes it could be separated with the ordinary "crime" or "violence". Because terrorism is a crime against humanity and a threat to human security and peace. An act of terror never look on how many the casualties during the operation. According to Paul Wilkinson, terrorism is 'a coercive political intimidation that systematically kills, destroys and threatens individuals, communities, and government' [5]. The objective of terrorism itself according to Thomas Koten, is 'to destroy and to destabilize power structure of state and nation in order to replace it with the new system' [6]. Hence, terrorism could mean a part of the insurgency, war, state terror, or propaganda [7]. Considering that terrorism is directly touching one of the core needs of state survival on legitimacy, the role of the government in dealing with terrorism will be inevitable.

This research aims to examine the significance of the current Indonesian leadership factor as the barrier to ISIS in advancing its movement in Indonesia. Understanding the transformation of a radical movement in Indonesia is important to know the development on how Indonesian government response terrorism. During the Soeharto's regime in *New Order Era*, the radical's movement did not occur in Indonesia because of the robust government implementation

on Subversion Act UU No. 11/PNPS/1963 [6]. But it does not mean that Indonesia was clear from any terrorist attacks during Soeharto's era. It is found there were several religious-affiliated bombings 1980's until the end of New Order regime. One of the most notable terrorist act during Soeharto's regime was the Garuda Indonesia flight 206 hijacked by Commando Jihad in 1981 and the Borobudur stupa's bombing by Husin Ali al Habysie in 1985 [8]. Most of the terrorist attack during Soeharto's era were neutralised by the Indonesian Police and Military Forces.

The democratisation process in Reformation era finally ended the New Order regime. At this point, the idea to established Indonesia as Islam country started to emerge by the radical movements such as Islamic Defender Front (FPI), *Hizbut-tahrir* (HT), *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (IM) and *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* [6]. Somehow, the idea to change Indonesian political system into an Islamic state is not popular among Indonesian. It could be seen from the position of the two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia which are represented by *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and *Muhammadiyah* that accept *Pancasila* and UUD 1945 (the Constitution) as basic principles of the state [9].

One of the prominent events which relate to counterterrorism began when Megawati Soekarnoputri stepped into the office and responded the 9/11 attack in the United States. The United States started the global war on terrorism campaign. It could be seen that the US perceive the 9/11 attack as the war declaration from Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden as he was accused by the US as the mastermind behind 9/11 attack. Hence, the US asked its allies and all another state to joins the "global war on terrorism".

Megawati was the first Muslim-majority country leader to visits President George Bush Jr. after the 9/11 attack [10]. The world noticed the visit as an expression of solidarity from Indonesia to the United States after the deadly terror attack. At first, the United States asked Indonesia to join the global war on terrorism. But the symbolic support from Megawati to join the global war on terror coming up after the Bali bombing terrorist attack in 2002. With the casualties reaching more than 200 people which most of them were foreigners. The Bali bombing showed that Indonesia was one of the operational bases of *Jamaah Islamiyah*, a US-listed terrorist organisation linked with Al-Qaeda [11]. As the terrorist threats increased dramatically, the Coordinator Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, formed the Combatting Terrorism Coordinating Desk in 2002. In the near end of Megawati presidential term, the anti-terror special detachment 88 (Densus 88 anti-terror) finally formed in response to counter the threat of terrorism in Indonesia.

One of the interesting developments happened as the Coordinator Minister for Political and Security Affairs during Megawati's era, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, decided to resign from his position in the cabinet. As a former minister in the security area, Yudhoyono aware about the detail on combatting terrorism. Later on, Yudhoyono ran as the presidential candidate and won the election by 61% vote in

2004. As a former four-star general, Yudhoyono was expected to have a better approach to security in relation with counter-terrorism. Indeed there were several terrorist attacks occurred during Yudhoyono presidential term. But there was no further terrorist attack against Western symbol after the 2009 hotel bombings in JW Marriot and Ritz Jakarta [12]. In 2010, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono established National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT). The main role and objective from BNPT could be found in the Presidential Decree No 46/2010. It explains how BNPT should exercise the counter-terrorism policy and protect the Indonesian citizen from any terrorist threat within the country. The very basic objective is to prevent and to halt the development of terrorism network within the country. There are two different approaches in counter-terrorism strategy. First, the violent approach conducted by the *Densus 88 Anti-Terror*. Second, the soft approach which use deradicalisation process. It is directed to guide and assist the transformation of the radical group into a non-radical group.

The current ISIS stronghold in Syria and Iraq has been weakened in 2016 [13], concurrently, the ISIS influence will expand geographically. The reasons why the ISIS could reach Southeast Asia region as a potential area for expansion is particularly because Indonesia is because there is a radical terrorist movement that has already existed in Indonesia and openly use violence to terrorise people. The primary objective from ISIS in Southeast Asia is the establishment of Islamic State in the region [14]. The threat from ISIS in Indonesia was started when ISIS militants decided to attack Jakarta and killed four civilians during the daylight operation. According to Indonesian Police Chief, Tito Karnavian, says that ISIS threat is real and dangerous when we talk about Indonesia because ISIS assumes Indonesia is not an Islamic country or a *Daulah Islamiyah* [15]. Showing that even Indonesia considered as the largest populous country in the world doesn't mean Indonesia will be invincible from ISIS threats.

The Indonesian government's response toward the terrorist attack in January 2016 under President Joko Widodo stresses on the claim that the situation was under control and things have returned to normal. Even such act of aggression toward non-combatant will disrupt the public security and peace in the society, but Joko Widodo seems to stay calm and firm to tell everyone that the government knows what to do. Hence, the role of the anti-terror authorities will be harder to make sure that the situation under control. The terrorist action is not expected by the perpetrator as an effort to achieve its political goal but to influence the target audience and change the people behaviour in a way that will serve the interest of the terrorists [16]. President Joko Widodo describes that the terrorist objective is to terrorise the majority population. It means if the majority population think that they are not safe anymore then one of the terrorist goals has been accomplished.

Unlike what was happened in France, when ISIS could successfully strike Paris with more than 100 casualties. Shortly after the Paris attack, French President, Francois

Hollande clearly confirm that "France is at war" [17]. On the other hand, Joko Widodo seems unalarmed with the attack. He did not declare war with the Islamic State. Indeed the number of victims is very different between Jakarta and Paris attack. But the way Joko Widodo behaves in public give a strong confidence that the government is reliable enough within the perception of Indonesians. It is proved by the trending Twitter in Indonesia flooded with "We are not afraid" hashtag.

President Joko Widodo possesses a different style of political communication compared to the previous presidents. Joko Widodo first year presidential term faced a tough challenge from *Koalisi Merah Putih* (the coalition of opposition parties) in the legislative. Somehow, President Joko Widodo managed the situation and used his communication strategy to reshape the relationship with the opposition. Joko Widodo proved that he is an implicit man with an effective communication with non-governmental parties gives him a tougher bargaining position [18]. This kind of communication strategy also being implemented to counter the threat of terrorism. It could be seen from his stance that Jokowi prefers to use "soft" religious and cultural approach to fighting terrorism compared to a "hard" security approach [19]. At the beginning of Joko Widodo presidency, he asked both *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah* to join his efforts to combat terrorism and extremism in Indonesia [20]. Both *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah* are considered as moderate Muslim organisations and also became two largest religious movements in Indonesia. The involvement of two largest Indonesian moderate religious Muslim organisations is because most of the terrorist groups in Indonesia are driven by religious motives. Hence, the religious clerics from both NU and *Muhammadiyah* could engage directly in a dialogue with radical movements in Indonesia. In the other word, the dialogue will give a proper understanding about Islamic religious teaching that suits well with the condition of Indonesia.

The main idea of President Joko Widodo counterterrorism strategy is by combining Indonesian military might with a "soft" approach to Islamist extremism that emphasised on religious and cultural value [21]. In the other word, dealing with radicalism is not only about countering with violence but also understanding with dialogue and political decision. One of the political agenda from Joko Widodo is to turn Indonesia into a global maritime fulcrum which allows global economic activities to use Indonesian strategic sea routes and ports. Apart from the economic motives that Indonesia will gain within the political agenda, it also gives a significant implication on how Indonesia security would be. In relation with transnational terrorist, it is estimated that around 200 Indonesians have travelled to the Middle East and join ISIS. In addition, a survey conducted at the end of 2015 showed that 96% of Indonesian are strongly opposed to the ISIS ideology [22]. The problem clearly lies in the 4% of the population. The Indonesian maritime security urges a more serious involvement of Indonesian Military Forces (TNI) in national defence. At this point, it shows that President Joko

Widodo needs assistance from national army to achieve his goal of national security [23].

The Indonesian government under President Joko Widodo is trying to revise the counterterrorism law. The basic idea is to give a more serious role in the national army in combating terrorism. The current Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Luhut Pandjaitan, emphasised that the government shouldn't rely only on *Densus 88 anti-terror*. Based on 2004 Law of TNI stating that the national army force could be involved in several non-military operations, which including anti-terror operations [24]. This idea clearly opposed to the view from human right activists as the Army could abuse its power with the new role. Apart from the fact that the revision of TNI involvement on anti-terrorism operation law still in the process in the legislative, it showed that Joko Widodo is firm both on his effort to fight back terrorism by any means necessary and prevent the radicalism in the society through "soft" approach.

3. Pancasila: Ideology as Counterterror Strategy

Unlike Al-Qaeda which dedicated themselves solely to terror operations instead of inspiring political movement [25], ISIS tends to influence broader society to raise their solidarity and brotherhood to fight against West and infidels by spreading the act of terror and inspire other to do so by communicating through Youtube, global propaganda and bombing attacks [26]. Nester observes that terror has 'no end' except the terror itself and it seems that this 'new-terrorism' has an elusive purpose and generate a more ideological war which is intangible and subjective, rather than the 'old-terrorism' as it only seeks revolution and deems political changes [27]. Therefore, to win the current war, states must protect their citizen primarily from ideological clashes between national ideology and radical dogma.

Ideology as an essential material in forming and defending the state from external and internal threats may generate an efficient strategy to counterterrorism in the context that ideology could filter any misleading and contradictory thoughts to nationalism. Indonesia with its *Pancasila* as a national ideology could becomes the most powerful instrument to obstruct radical and extreme thoughts that potentially endanger the state. The ideology encompasses whole factors that matter in life from religious belief until social justice for all people. With *Pancasila*, society believes that nationalism can walk simultaneously with religious values because of religion is part of *Pancasila* itself. Drawing the idea that *Pancasila* assures the freedom of faith of all believers from various religions and demand people to worship in one and only God as religion is a social infrastructure that can shape a civilised society. However, practices of believers must be addressed as communal activities which must not disrespect others and threaten nationhood.

Pancasila as an ideology stresses nationalism as the

common goal by adapting religious values into its principle. Van der Veer denotes several typologies of the nexus between nationalism and religion, one fits to Indonesia that religions are embedded within the spirit of nationalism of the country [28]. It is because religions shape the national character of Indonesian and transform them into a civilized society which generates common national identity [29].

Unlike many countries which institutionalise religions to states or governing with a secular ideology, Indonesia performs unique system that separates religion and political affairs, yet a secular state. Instead, the ideology engenders a mixture of nationalism and religious values. This model obtained during the era of colonisation and independence which required Muslims in Indonesia to repel foreign influences; thus Islam reinforced nationalism [30]. This uniqueness makes a barrier to the radical extremism thoughts, including the presence of ISIS radical views that spread amongst society. However, this essay does not deny that ISIS has truly successful in infiltrating its ideology to certain numbers of people in Indonesia.

The spread of radical dogma within Indonesia is dominantly managed by Islamic terrorist network, including ISIS. Many theses mention that the proliferation of this teaching highly correlates with the economic posture of the host country. Hence, Indonesia becomes a strategic source of supports since the country categorised as 'lower-middle' income level though the GDP is among the 20 world's highest [31]. For this case, other social scientists believe that the recruitment process within the terrorist group has no relation to economic condition of the society they targeted because the group sought to apply strict processes of selection to fulfil their internal demand of high qualified fighters. Therefore, economic condition, personal pressure and despair do not motivate a person to involve in a terrorist network, it is personal intention driven by external inspiration including terrorist act and radical thoughts [32] that is considered as mis-leading teaching of *Jihad* concept in Islam [33].

But this radical view unable to provoke majority Muslims within the country to participate in global jihad under ISIS commands. *Pancasila* as ideology mandates government and society to unite in an ethnically, economically and religiously diverse environment. The ideology demands society to precede nationalism over individual interests, including individual identity, through social cohesion. It leads the country to shape the moderate national character and identity by mediating various partial thoughts on culture, politics, religions, social and economics [34]. *Pancasila* assures every citizen receives an equal treatment and rights before the law as well as requires them to believe in God as the first *sila* mentions that the ideology must believe in the one and only God. Amir examines the effectiveness of *Pancasila* as a national ideology in determining national identity and character; he found that education is an appropriate institution to instil the ideology among younger generations [34]. *Pancasila* has considered successful for more than 70 years defending Indonesia from extreme ideology, though in

the earlier period Islamic fundamentalists had struggled for their claim on *Daulah Islamiyah* which later defeated by the government [35].

Pancasila as the foundation of living for Indonesians adopts Islamic values that appear on the first *sila* (principle) 'Believe in one and only God' which later interpreted as the unifying factor of diversity in Indonesia. It stresses on how to foster unity among different religions in Indonesia rather than questioning where is Islam in Indonesian constitution [36]. The strength of *Pancasila* lies on its pluralistic values that respect anyone and disagree with a specific system that benefits certain communities. Written in the history that *Darul Islam* revolt had failed to promote its Islamic order due Indonesian Muslim was mostly tolerant to other, incidentally it was a hierarchic order from *Ulama* [37]. In this context, *Ulama* performs as 'models of behaviour' and take a leadership role in the society in a microscopic scope of social life [38].

The integration of *Pancasila* into daily social life is absolutely a government duty. However, it is undeniable that some Islamic-based organisations in Indonesia have helped the government in forming the collective national character of *Pancasila*. *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah* are the two most significant and largest Islamic organisations in the country, NU is estimated to have followers ranging from quarter to more than a half of Indonesian Muslims, while Muhammadiyah is estimated below that number [39]. Both are categorised as a religious-nationalistic institution which sought to educate society in religious basis as well as advocate them on social issues (health, education, etc.) despite their theological differences [40].

It is essential to explore these two Islamic organisations due to its uniqueness of cultures. Common perspective illustrates that homogeneity of the community will not sustain a harmonious life within a country [41] because extremism and intolerant behaviour nurtured within exclusive groups. NU and *Muhammadiyah* as exclusive communities which manage a large number of followers are able to rebut this view by proving that they accept and perform *Pancasila* in their social life [42]. *Nahdlatul Ulama* as the largest Islamic organization contributes more in integrating *Pancasila* into social life due its believe on the idea of *hubbul wathon minal imaan* (love for the homeland is part of faith) as the foundation to nationalism within grass-root society [43], while *Muhammadiyah* seeks to transform *ummah* into a community that can engage with globalized world [44].

The identification of both organisations in supporting nationalism is represented by the strong indoctrination of *Ulama* (preachers) to share peace among Indonesians and defend the country by any means within the NU community, also delivering social services to strengthen Islamic values as well as involving in the political arena through political parties for *Muhammadiyah* community. These examples exhibit the loyalty to the nation instead of bringing radical ideology to oppressed unbelievers. To some points, NU declares themselves as the protector of Indonesia, in the

sense that the community should be physically ready to defend the country from external threat including ideological clashes which threaten the existence of *Pancasila* and local wisdom [43].

In response to block radical ideology, such as ISIS propaganda, that potentially threatens national resilient, both Islamic-nationalist organisations established religious-based schools and learning methods. Education is believed as a tool to negotiate changes, and the presence of NU and Muhammadiyah are able to build a strong foundation to diversity in the lowest level of society [45]. It is obvious that these two organisations are exclusive and potentially bring intolerance because any collectivism of similarity would be profoundly anti-democratic [46]. It is unnecessary to debate on general public schools because its plurality and inclusiveness are evident. However, though religious-based schools nurture homogeneity among students, those schools under NU and Muhammadiyah still values diversity, equality and nationalism [47].

Moreover, there has been no single fact that shows terrorists in Indonesia ever learnt from both educational institutions. On the contrary, other Islamic schools such *Az-Zaytun* and *Al-Mukmin*, have been widely known as breeding schools for young jihadists because they indoctrinate students with violent jihadist teaching who must proclaim war against unbeliever and insist Islamic state in Indonesia [48]. It implies an assumption that schools under NU and Muhammadiyah inculcate *Pancasila* to students by emphasizing on harmony between humankind (*hablum minannas*) in a diverse environment. This doctrine puts nationalism and unity before the individual or communal identity, make resistant toward contradicting ideology possible.

Therefore, *Pancasila* as a fundamental ideology for Indonesians could maintain its national interest and unity over individual or communal concerns. It demands society to respect diversity and nationalism for common identity as it allows each religious, ethnic or any groups to perform their beliefs and assures that their rights are equal and must be protected from the other group's disrespect. This ideology hides power to guide society in living within diverse environment due to its accommodative capability to contain all differences and advance unity to produce tolerance and coexistence among communities. Including NU and Muhammadiyah as exclusive communities that agree on *Pancasila* as national ideology and believe that it would not ruin their faith, even these two organisations put more attention to *Pancasila* by establishing schools that nurture nationalism to block radical thoughts. Thus, *Pancasila* becomes the most fundamental counterterror strategy within the plural but Muslim-majority society.

4. Conclusion

Joko Widodo has a great start and is gradually becoming an influential leader in combatting terrorism. He was success to manage the state under control and not being easily

provoked by terrorist attacks of ISIS. Judging from the way he wants to improve Indonesian capacity on coercive counter-terrorism using BNPT and Densus 88 Anti-Terror, the government proposes the idea of national military armies involvement in a counterterrorism operation. Moreover, the idea to make Indonesia as a maritime nexus will increase the national security. Joko Widodo is not only improving the strength of national police and military, he also cooperates with religious organisations due to its importance in combatting terrorism. The involvement from both NU and Muhammadiyah on deradicalisation process is expected to change the way of thinking of a radical group and people in Indonesia.

On the other hand, deradicalisation process in Indonesia must not be separated from the cultivation of Pancasila as state ideology which successfully consolidates society to build trust on nationalism and pledge loyalty to the state by ignoring contradicting values, including ISIS dogma. It is related to the ability of Pancasila to accommodate all backgrounds within a diverse society and brings common interests instead of individual or communal benefits. It becomes the counterterror strategy which comprehensively reaches the whole elements of society to the grass root level. *Nahdlatul Ulama* and Muhammadiyah help the state to promote Pancasila as state ideology through social advocacy and education, shaping Muslims in Indonesia to agree upon a common identity with other groups in their social life. Tolerance and coexistence are the two primary points that embedded within the diverse environment in a Muslim-majority country.

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