

# Analysis of Institutional Constraints for the Search for Motivation and Involvement of Social Actors in Rural Land Certification in Aniassué (Côte d'Ivoire)

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**Abstract:** This article aims to analyze the constraints related to the low level of formalization of rural rights in Côte d'Ivoire. To achieve this objective, field surveys were conducted in the localities of Aniassué and Ettienkro, two villages in the Sub-prefecture of Aniassué in the Department of Abengourou. The choice of these localities is motivated by the multiplication of land security programs through land certification at work in these villages. The methodology used is a judicious combination of both quantitative and qualitative approaches on the principle of an interactive approach. The quantitative approach made it possible to collect quantifiable and measurable data from a questionnaire on a population group composed of 94 rights holders. As for the qualitative approach, it made it possible to collect nominal data from the use of the tools of the Accelerated Method of Participatory Research including interviews, observation, the Venn diagram, the problem tree and the solution tree. The results obtained put into perspective the demotivation of local actors and members of Village Land Management Committees (CVGF), the insufficient training of these actors, slowness in the recruitment of expert firms, administrative burdens in the validation of land certificates as well as the non-representativeness of state and private land structures involved in land certification.

**Keywords:** Institutional Constraints, Land Certification, Motivation, Security, Rights

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## 1. Introduction

In almost all African rural societies, tradition and customs are the mechanism for protecting and defining the mode of access to land. In this management system, the land chief, or village chief, acts as the custodian of the land. These traditional authorities ensure the distribution of land (collective good) to all the communities present according to traditional land codes [1, 7, 13].

From the era of colonization to the present day, we are witnessing a dynamic and a form of mixing of cultural values through globalization that tries to modify these existing traditions and customs. Indeed, the shift from collective to private ownership of land has reduced the power of the land chief. Nevertheless, the practice of collective land administration is not neglected. It should be

noted that land rights and land management systems are manifold. For example, rights of use, access and control, usufruct, and many other forms of access to land continue to exist. These rights modalities derive from traditional social institutions, such as family agreements, kinship, marriage, etc. [5, 14, 16].

To give legal character to these land practices and a modern status to rural land management, land policies have emerged. Thus, the Ivorian State, like the disturbances that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, adopted the Ivorian Rural Land Code of 1998 to regulate tensions over land. To achieve this objective, amendments have been made, following the many criticisms that this land law has aroused. This is Decree No. 2004-412 of 14

August 2004 following the Linas-Marcoussis agreements, amending Articles 6 and 26 with a view to integrating non-national heirs into the benefit of rights acquired previously [2, 15, 17].

Beyond this reform and financing, it was the advent of the decentralization of these land policies in order to make this tool operational and applicable. Thus, several land institutions have emerged.

First, the National Project for the Management of Terroirs and Rural Equipment (PNGTER) was built to better adapt to the context of emerging from the crisis within 2 years to meet the aspirations of rural populations. In order for this programme to be accepted, the State has opted for infrastructure-oriented micro-projects. These include, for example, the development of lowlands and the control of water, wells, schools and health centres. The will of the State was to prepare an Involuntary Resettlement and Compensation Plan (PRIC). The PNGTER as initially planned should cover thirteen areas, but socio-political constraints forced the Ivorian State to carry out its activities related to this program in five (05) areas that are Abengourou, Bondoukou, Daoukro, Daloa and Soubré [10].

Then other institutions were initiated. This is the case of the Land Information System (SIF), a device that manages the cadastre. It operates in networks and involves other institutions in the management of rural land, including the Ministry of Agriculture as manager of the rural land domain, the Regional Tax Directorate of the Ministry of Economy and Finance responsible for land registration and the preservation of property titles. As for the Rural Land Commission (CFR), it proposes all additions and modifications to the existing rural land tenure legal framework. It suggests the studies necessary for a good evolution of the rural land sector, monitors the progress of these studies, evaluates the results and recommendations. In addition to these land institutions, there is the Rural Land Observatory (OFR) whose objective is to ensure the provision of basic information such as the area, price and allocation of rural land subject to change. Its purpose is also to process data relating to the characteristics of the development of these lands. The importance given to these institutions has not allowed the effective application of the Rural Land Code. However, it is up to local institutions such as the Village Rural Land Management Committees (CVGFR), close to rural communities, to take over. Governed by Decree No. 99-593 of 13 October 1999 on the organization and attributions of Rural Land Management Committees (CGFR) and by Order No. 041 MEMID/MINAGRA of 12 June 2001 on the constitution and functioning of Rural Land Management Committees, the CVGFR are responsible for studying files concerning village terroirs [3, 6, 10].

In practice, the RBVCs participate in the conduct of the Official Inquiry, the maintenance of a register of agreements and objections, the approval of the results of the Official Inquiry, the signing of the finding of continuous and peaceful existence of customary rights over a plot, the settlement of

subsequent conflicts and objections made during the Official Inquiry. As attributions, it should be noted that the CVGFR's mission is to study files concerning the terroirs of the villages. This body participates in the conduct of the official survey through the empirical organization of tasks during the survey. Thus, its function is to keep a register of agreements and objections when an application for a land certificate takes place in the said village where the official inquiry takes place. It is therefore the committee that is responsible for validating the results of this survey. It is obliged to remove all disputes or constraints that hinder the process of securing the customary land rights of applicants. To this end, the CVGFR has the signature of the declaration of continuous and peaceful existence of customary rights on a plot and the settlement of consecutive conflicts on the plots to be certified [11].

To strengthen its land management actions, the Ivorian State, by Decree No. 2016-590 of 3 August 2016, allowed the creation and allocation of the organization and functioning of the Rural Land Agency (AFOR). Several tasks are dedicated to this agency. For example, its purpose is to carry out actions to secure rural land, in particular through the conclusion of agreements, to mobilize resources for the implementation of actions to secure rural land, to advise the public authorities on all issues related to the management of rural land, to take or propose any measure to facilitate the implementation of the law [4, 8, 9]. These land institutions had a national vision; to manage Ivorian rural land as a whole by protecting the rights of occupants and reducing land conflicts. However, the observation is alarming: the formalization of rural land rights is still problematic because of the low acquisition of land certificates in some villages including Aniassué and Ettienkro in the Sub-prefecture of Aniassué.

Indeed, less than 25% of the land in these localities is certified, despite the intervention of the World Bank, the European Union and PAMOFOR. In addition to this low registration rate, decentralized land institutions are under a lot of constraints.


This article, which aims to analyze these constraints both at the level of the Village Rural Land Management Committees and at the level of decentralized administrative structures in the villages of Aniassué and Ettienkro will be done according to the following plan: i) affinity and low participation of members of the Village Committee for Rural Land Management (CVGFR); ii) insufficient training of members and technical constraints within the CVGFR; (iii) low staff and differences of opinion between the public and private administration responsible for land certification; (iv) administrative burden in the validation of land certificates; v) the experience of weak decentralization of local land structures through the PAMOFOR project.

## 2. Methodology

The investigation took place in the localities of Aniassué and Ettienkro. These two villages are located about 23

kilometers from the town of Abengourou. The choice of these localities focuses on the multiplication of land security programs through land certification. However, the low mobilization of customary land rights holders is not to be ruled out of this choice. This present study is part of a dual methodological approach with data collection techniques specific to each. The first so-called quantitative approach is intended to be partial. It has made it possible to collect quantifiable and measurable data on a sufficiently large population group. The methodological basis of this approach is the use of a questionnaire on the satisfaction of the deadline for the allocation of land certificates to 94 customary land rights holders in these two localities. These data collected with the questionnaire were processed with the Sphinx plus 2 software. The analysis of these data is based on descriptive statistical analysis. The second so-called qualitative approach made it possible to collect nominal data through the technique of documentary research, direct observation and individual and group interviews. The interviews carried out are in line with qualitative studies. The principle being to minimize the exhaustive size of respondents and representativeness, the collection of qualitative data targeted resource persons with an efficient reading of rural land issues related to our field of investigation, namely that of the search for institutional constraints on land in the formalization of rural rights. The tools related to these different techniques are the reading grid, the observation grid, the maintenance guides, the problem tree and the solution tree relating to the constraints observed in local land institutions. The figures below are an illustration of these different problem trees.

Our CVGFs don't work well




Source: Field survey, July-September 2021

**Figure 1.** Problem tree of the Village Rural Land Management Committee.

This figure presents the monograph of the constraints faced by committee members in the localities studied. The following tool is an answer to these problems.


Our CVGFs work well



Source: Field survey, July-September 2021

**Figure 2.** Problem tree of the Village Rural Land Management Committee.

To these different problem trees is added the Venn diagram, another tool of the MARP technique that gives a general view of the relational constraints between the different local institutions that should interact for the implementation of rural land formalization policies. The figure below shows this situation.



Source: Field survey, July-September 2021

**Figure 3.** Venn diagram of the land structures of the localities studied.

In addition, the content analysis following the thematic analysis was linked to the qualitative data for their analysis. All these data were analyzed through the comprehensive method and systemic analysis in accordance with their epistemological criteria. The use of these analytical methods has made it possible to make the constraints at the level of rural land management institutions intelligible.

### 3. Results

#### 3.1. Affinity and Low Participation in Village Rural Land Management Committees (CVGFR)

Based on the mechanisms of the constitution of the committees and their functioning, the role of the CVGFR is to promote a model of decentralized land governance. Indeed,

it is a body charged with meeting the challenge of transforming customary rights into modern laws. Thus, because of its ability to manage land security taking into account the socio-cultural realities on which rural societies are based and the basis of all social relations, the CVGFR should allow for the participatory recognition of rights. In order to provide a comprehensive solution to all the problems related to applications for land certificates, the committee in its constitution has the obligation to ensure that all communities are represented and to participate actively in its functioning. However, the surveys show that the CVGFR of the said villages surveyed encounter difficulties in their organization and functioning. In its composition, the committee often meets with two (02) or three (03) people to discuss land matters that concern land disputes, the recognition of rights and limits on the plots to be certified. In addition to the small number, the renewal of the committee or the appointment of its members is not done on a regular basis in accordance with the texts that organize it. After two (02) years, the same committee that sat is sometimes renewed on the pretext that the committee did not work. This is due to the delay in decision-making in rural land policies. Several recorded testimonies support this institutional weakness. Mr. A. T., member of the Village Committee for Rural Land Management of Aniassué, justifies this assertion:

«The constraints come from the organization of the committee. The committee is composed of 16 members. These 16 members have never been together even to hold a meeting or make decisions on this or that subject. It can be said that the committee is based on one person or even two (02). More often than not, the president and secretary do all the work. It is on them that the committee rests».

Nanan A. II, Chief Canton of Aniassué, explains that:

«It was a small interim committee that was put there. It is volunteering, because they are not paid. It's a 4 to 6 person thing. If there is a case, we come to them and they go into the field. They have no status (...). I see it as a family thing, it's not well structured. Not everyone has their word. What we say is not what the agent will write and it makes that when we receive the requests to validate it is difficult (...). Sometimes they meet in small groups».

The Village Committee for Rural Land Management is most often reduced to a family that takes on the meaning of a network of friends, diverted from any real function for the whole community and most often, its renewal is not brought to the attention of the population. These two narratives also fail to demonstrate that the decentralization of land governance has not sufficiently addressed members' expectations. It did not provide the necessary resources to manage the committee effectively. Thus, the effective non-involvement of its members leads to the strengthening of indigenous ties in the decision-making and control of the Committee. These organizational constraints explain the low level of functioning of the latter. In addition to this non-transparent structure, there is a lack of interest among some members due to the fact that in the committee the tasks of each individual are not professionalized by giving them a

special status that would legitimize their function. The testimony of Mr. K. F, Investigating Commissioner, participating in a group interview organized at the Directorate of Agriculture reinforces this analysis:

«In some cases, it is the secretary who does everything. In many cases, the committee has never changed its secretary. Others are temporarily replaced without keeping us informed. When there is information to pass on not everyone is informed».

In structuring the Committee, it is noted that there is a gap between the theoretical and practical framework of land governance in rural Ahua. Indeed, there are actions of inequity and discrimination in the process of formalizing customary land rights. Thus, the influence of certain actors in the committee raises the issue of good governance within the committees if they are to be reduced to a small nucleus that ensures the control of land information within the said structure. The family nature of these committees also reflects the lack of clarity and objectivity in the actions due to the strong representativeness of a group of people with strong community relations within the committee.

### **3.2. Insufficient Training of Members and Technical Constraints Within the VGFRs**

The other constraint of the rural land certification process is the training of committee members, which is an essential aspect of the analysis of the committee's functioning and makes it possible to determine the level of integration of its members. Thus, as part of several programs such as the Rural Land Support Program (PARF), training has been initiated for committee members. To this end, about 4480 presidents and secretaries of the CVGFR of 2240 villages of Côte d'Ivoire from 38 departments of the country received this training. However, for the villages surveyed, the chairpersons and secretaries of committees testified to the non-existence of continuous training within the committees. Indeed, they explain that their training is limited to the simple use of the register of agreements and oppositions on applications. They do not have any IT tools to archive land information for useful purposes in case of loss of physical data. The words of Mr. K. F, former secretary of the CVGFR of Aniassué illustrate these observations:

«(...) Sufficiently trained, I don't think so. The training happened only once (...). When they arrive, they do not give all the information about the activities. After that when people come to see us, it is difficult to give them all the details about the projects. They come with their program and we just follow. That's all! Otherwise real training, there is no appropriate training for us».

Mr. K. M, Investigating Commissioner at the DAA, for his part, explains:

«It is not enough to give them only registers of agreements and objections. Thought should be given to involving them actively in the various projects because information about an activity in the villages is not communicated every day. Once people pass by, you have to wait months to come back. When that's how it is, the members of the Committee

do not see the point of the projects. It must also have perfect communication between the members and with the Management. Consideration should be given to providing them with an integrated information system to better archive existing land data in order to facilitate the formalization of land rights».

These various meetings raise the problem of coordinating action on the training of Committee members. In general, they are solicited only for the implementation of land programs in their locality. To this end, it is noted that they are absent in the design phase of these programmes. In addition to this constraint, it appears that there is a lack of technicality in terms of equipment to facilitate the management of information on rural land.

### **3.3. Low Number of Staff and Differences of Opinion Between the Public and Private Administration Responsible for Land Certification**

Throughout the Ivorian territory, particularly in the department of Abengourou, there are insufficient administrative and private staff responsible for rural land certification. At the level of the Regional Directorate of Agriculture of Abengourou (DRAA), the number of investigating commissioners is three (03) agents. As for the surveyors, there are four (04) and there is only one (01) Land Agent. However, field surveys revealed that the small number of surveyors has a direct impact on land certification and the effective implementation of the 1998 Law on Rural Land. This testifies to the non-competitiveness in the order of surveyors which increasingly favors a kind of permanent autonomy in controlling the cost of their different service. In this regard, Mr. A. S., retired executive of the village of Aniassué, explains:

«For my part, the fact that it is a private company and that access to the training of surveyors is very expensive and the appointment to the order of surveyors is also limited, immediately they have the power to control everything. If the state has decided that this is so, it is because land management is a heavy burden. Therefore, it is important to entrust it to private structures so that everything goes normally. But when their number is limited, there is no competition and everything becomes expensive».

Mr. A. S., representative of one of the surveyors, adds:

«If expert surveyors are few, this is reflected in the high cost of their training and the fact that some surveyors decide to limit themselves to the profession of surveyor without resorting to the expertise of their profession, that is to say their integration into the order of expert surveyors. For them, the field of topographic study is a job where the risks are enormous with repeated land conflicts».

Moreover, even if the total number is set at 46 agents throughout the Ivorian territory (because of the constraints related to this profession), the deployment and intervention of these agents in each city remains limited by the barrier measures already pre-established by the texts that organize this field of activity. However, if Law No. 70-487 of 3 August on the function of the surveyor allows in its article 11

that the State is represented before the National Council of the Order of Expert Surveyors by a government commissioner appointed by decree, if article 25 of this law stipulates that this law will be published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire and executed as a State Law, the question remains on the lack of subsidy of the profession of surveyor-expert despite these two (02) articles that show the involvement of the State in land governance. Is it a question of full responsibility of surveyors in their function or a strategy of disengagement of the State to avoid complaints from applicants for land certificates on the cost of carrying out the plan of their land assets depending on whether one is in a customary rural or urban environment? In this regard, even if this concern does not seem to find an answer among rural populations, it could be explained by the services of the surveyor-expert who ask for significant funding for the security of rural land whose costs the State does not seem to bear. This is why in such a context, the State is led to play a double game, either to use aid to support rural populations in securing their customary land rights or to leave the free choice to these populations to formulate their own request. The words of Mr. K. M., Investigating Commissioner bear witness to this. For him:

«Land tenure security is very cumbersome and also expensive. This is why the State signs aid agreements with institutions such as the World Bank and the European Union. Today, we are talking about AFOR with the PARMOFOR project that works with G-TEC in the Department of Abengourou. It's a huge job, because one firm for all this work is difficult. Generally, these firms make things expensive. This problem needs to be addressed. This is the problem we had when we worked with CETIF with the World Bank. We had all the problems, because the cabinet intervened everywhere and some plans of the plots delimited so far are not found and we can not issue certain land certificates».

From this speech, it emerges that the surveyor-expert is essential in securing rural land with a significant cost to be raised from his services. Aware of this state of affairs, the State through AFOR is recruiting firms to support this agency in its mission. However, past experiences show that the low recruitment of firms for the implementation of rural land security programs has a negative impact on the realization of land certificates. Indeed, the management of all tasks relating to the registration of customary land rights by a single structure leads to a lack of control and control of land data given the large or even large size of village territories and plots to be delimited.

### **3.4. Slowness in the Recruitment of Expert Firms and Constraints in Actions**

In the case of the AFOR mission, a delay in the recruitment of surveyors' firms was noted. Indeed, subcontracting with the firms of surveyors-experts was a response to the acceleration of rural land tenure security by distributing thousands of land certificates. This subcontracting is a form of cooperation between the State



and the private sector by proceeding by call for tenders. This offer consisted in studying the profile of the firms of surveyors. Thus, the selected firms should support the State in the framework of the Project for the Improvement and Implementation of the Rural Land Policy of Côte d'Ivoire (PAMOFOR-CI). On the other hand, since the launch of AFOR in 2018 in Abengourou, the study of technical files continued to be done until G-TEC was retained in 2020 for land security operations in this locality. This administrative slowness raises the problem of the delay in the implementation of the PNSFR in five (05) years from the launch of AFOR at the national level on July 17, 2018, due to two (02) years of delay and three (03) years for its effective implementation in the localities under study. To this end, the words of Mr. L. K, Representative of AFOR (ROT), at the launch of PAMOFOR at the Sub-prefecture of Aniassué, justify this administrative slowness:

«We urge you to be peaceful (...) because we have fallen behind. In principle, it is in three (03) years that everything must be done but we have accumulated delay. Today, with PAMOFOR and the G-TEC group selected on four (04) firms and you the various committees and their representatives, we must achieve this goal. Given this delay, we are counting on you to do this work in 18 months to be in time».

Mr. K. M, Investigating Commissioner at the DAA, adds: «(...) It was like previous years with the European Union. People hung around with the projects and it was at the last minute that they retained CETIF so that things really

started in Abengourou, but in a short time. Finally, we are faced with the fait accompli. The results obtained are not of quality. The pressure is so great that we are often overwhelmed and some certificates do not succeed because of errors on the surface of the plots».

The slow implementation of rural land security programmes distorts results because the time allotted for the implementation of the programme forces the agents concerned to work under constraint and passively in order to meet the expectations of economic institutions.

### 3.5. Administrative Burdens in the Validation of Land Certificates

*Table 1. Distribution of respondents by duration of CF validation.*

Time of CF validation	Number of observations	Frequencies
Very supportive	08	08,50%
Unfavourable	26	27,70%
Not at all favorable	60	63,80%
TOTAL	94	100%

Source: our field survey, July-September 2020

The majority of CF applicants in the two villages under study agreed, i.e. 63.80%, that the time for validating applications is not at all appreciable while 27.70% say that this time is favorable. Only 08.50% of applicants who find that the validation time of CF is very favorable. The analysis of some land certificates at their regulators reinforces these statistical data.

*Table 2. Validation of the survey and time for issuing the land certificate.*

Localities	Period of validation of the survey by the CVGFR	Period of establishment	Perception of the deadlines issuance of the FC
ANIASSUE	20/08/2014	28/03/2016	It went on too long
	03/10/2014	19/09/2015	It went on too long
	25/08/2008	30/03/2016	It really lasted
ETTIENKRO	Identification of rights	Not yet	It's slow
	Identification of rights	Not yet	It's slow
	Identification of rights	Not yet	It's slow

Source: our field survey, July-September 2020

We find the explanations relating to the long duration of the issuance of CF in the words of Mr. A. K., Member of the CVGFR of Aniassué:

«Mr. G. K. F was our predecessor. He was in the first office, but people kept their case going because there was a lot of reluctance. They had to take their time. They launched their investigation of commodo and incommodo, people did not come and it was at the last minute that there were papers of agreements and oppositions that people came to fill. That is what created the delay. At the same time, it was necessary to recognize the sensitivity of these problems on earth by going slowly (...). There are too many steps to follow. And with all this time, others do not pose their problems quickly. Others on the other hand made their request, there was no opposition but they spent more than 3 years waiting for their land certificate. Some so far have not yet gotten for them».

The sensitivity of rural land management and the emphasis on commodo and incommodo surveys delay the validation of the land certificate. This delay is explained by the negligence and ignorance of some rural actors regarding the non-compliance with the process of validation of the survey knowing that the validation of the survey is prepared by the publicity of it in the village where the request is made. This advertising is carried out with the agreement of the CVGFR over a period of three (03) months. Also to avoid possible conflicts after the closure of the advertisement, the Ivorian rural land law allows the dissatisfied applicant to submit a final request for investigation within six (06) months. All these procedures that follow the validation of the investigation may extend over one (01) year in case of opposition. However, even if no objection is made, the observation of certain land certificates has shown that this validation exceeds the deadline provided for by law.

### 3.6. The Experience of Weak Decentralization of Local Land Structures Through the PAMOFOR Project

In the procedure for obtaining the FC, there are participatory management structures that bring together two (02) to three (03) categories of actors. These are private sector employees, civil servants or representatives of the public administration and representatives of the local population. It is through these actors from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, the Ministry of Economic Infrastructure and the Cadastre, Topography and Land Conservation Service that the State offers technical support to the Rural Land Management Committee. The representatives of the local community, namely the CVGFR, CSPGFR and others, bring their expertise in socio-historical data with regard to the registration of the historical rights of the occupants of the land. In the exercise of their function relating to the implementation of rural land tenure security, these actors encounter structural difficulties due to a lack of synergy which results in weak collaboration between MINADER, AFOR and the Rural Land Conservation Service (SCFR). The difficulties of connection between these three structures responsible for land security are presented as the experience of a problem of decentralization of the tasks of rural land actors in the department of Abengourou through the PAMOFOR project as presented by the story of Mr. L. K., Land Agent of the Departmental Directorate of Agriculture of Abengourou who expresses himself in these terms:

«Normally, they came to work, to issue CF over five (05) years but after they came back, they say they will do this over 18 months in three sub-prefectures. When they came to see us, they said they need us and so far nothing. So, since AFOR cannot come to the field, it has created a sub-project to be able to do its activities. It is this project that is called PAMOFOR. To participate in the project, we were made to do tests. For us agricultural land agents you make a move (slide). But once you go there, the state stops paying you. Everything is now managed by the Ministry of the Interior, since the AFOR itself is a project of the Prime Minister where all the representatives are of the Prime Minister. So, currently the Prefect and the Sub-Prefects are the only ones to decide. We ourselves in the Ministry of Agriculture have been sidelined. The DR already has its representative there, it is all of them who form the ROT collective. At our level, AFOR has not done anything yet. These are the old files that we manage. It is now they have come to see us for our files that are in progress, that is to say the CF that are in advertising, that's it! They want to take these files as if they were the ones who made them. But we told them that most of the files we have here are private files. These are people who have paid money. So, if they want to repay their money or let them go to follow up, because it's all well and good to have a CF but you have to have the land title. Currently themselves, they have started to recruit private investigation commissioners (...) all of us have applied, the World Bank has received

our files and we are still waiting. Yet things are happening on the ground».

By delegating rural land security activities to MINADER, AFOR and SCFR, the State should promote good decentralization by allowing it to have perfect communication between these three structures that are in a way the lungs of the implementation of the Law. However, since the advent of AFOR, the State has been unable to ensure rural land management by dedicating to AFOR the prerogatives of the DFR and even those of MINADER. This situation makes MINADER inactive, while this structure is much closer to farmers like the CVGFR. For the State the Administration being cumbersome it is necessary to allow a private structure to take control of the rural land issue. In these cases, the land agents of MINADER, the Director of MINADER represented on the commission of the prime minister (the collective of AFOR with the Prefects and Sub-Prefects) are less involved in rural land tenure security.

## 4. Discussion

Defined as a land policy, land institutions appear as structuring ideologies and organizing land security activities. As part of the modernization of the habits and customs that regulate the use of land, these land institutions face a set of constraints. The results obtained were presented in three dimensions. A first dimension deals with questions of motivation of local actors, members of Village Land Management Committees (CVGF). Throughout the discussion with these actors and even with those of the public and private administration, the question of motivation arose as an imminent constraint in terms of collective participation in the context of securing land rights. While this problem seems practically non-existent in the alternative search for solutions to secure land. However, it is necessary to question the active involvement and economic interests of the members of the committee insofar as any participation in a project requires an informed consensus, this is a means of stimulating joint actions and achieving the objectives pursued by the Ivorian draft law on land. In this vein, it is important to maintain, as Reverdy [12] points out, that the behaviour of Committee members indicates that organizational structure plays an important role without being entirely determinative. This assumes that although the structure strongly influences the position of action of the members in the management of rural lands, and therefore their rationality, it should also be noted that the articulation between rationality is assumed partly by the organizational structure and partly by the management team, by its arbitrations. This bipolar situation implies a certain logic of action on the part of Ivorian land legislators. Giving an important place to local actors is therefore an inclusive privilege in land management. The absence of this flexibility is the consequence of deviant behaviors thus causing the low participation of populations in land security activities and subsequently develops strategies to stigmatize community belonging. This strategy, as mentioned, is at the origin of the parallel appointment of

members for the composition of the CVGFR. In 2015, one of the Audace Institut studies noted this remark but without analyzing the impact it has on the organization and transparency of land security.

This is why one of the measures advocated by Alerte Foncier and INADES is the capacity building of CVGFR members. Indeed, for these institutions, in each village, the land operator should study the representativeness of the CVGFR and compliance with the provisions relating to equity. We agree with these institutions that awareness-raising work in focus groups in the village should also be encouraged to facilitate this verification. In particular, the land operator must ensure that each VGFR includes representatives of women, youth, and indigenous and non-indigenous communities. Capacity building of the CVGFR therefore requires the provision of the necessary skills and tools to carry out their mission in each village. Some dimensions, such as the formation and representativeness of state and private land structures, remain to be examined. For the time being, research relating mainly to the training of Committee members seems almost non-existent. The results produced on this dimension are an indicator that facilitates the registration of land data and the operation of land activities in the field. In rural areas, departments, prefectures and sub-prefectures, in the directorates of agriculture and many other services relating to rural land management, training remains limited insofar as it is not continuous. Better still, land stakeholders are trained spontaneously, and this training is limited only to the implementation of rural land security programs. In 2011, this issue was discussed in Mali's land security tools. It was pointed out that the lack of skills of professional actors and the ignorance of the large number of other actors on the policy and texts governing land are the identified causes of weaknesses observed in the design and management of land and land. As a result, capacity building of the various land stakeholders is necessary and urgent. This reinforcement allows each of these actors to be active and effective in the accomplishment of its tasks. Land stakeholders of all categories as well as training topics relating to the understanding of land policy and texts, modern and traditional institutions, customary rules, conflict resolution, judicial institutions in charge of land, land and the economy, the creation and dissemination of state and land information should therefore be strengthened. This is a strategy to strengthen local skills to the implementation of a real security policy. Such an orientation will have to meet the new important demand for multidisciplinary training, technology, land law, taxation, land mediation. This is a necessity given the dynamics of the reconfiguration of rural land ownership in the scarcity of land for agriculture and demographic pressure.

These technical notes highlight the incompleteness of the decentralization of local land structures. Indeed, the transfer of land management powers is not effective and often leads to a lack of synergy between the State's land management services and between the State and its private partners involved in this management. While elsewhere, as

demonstrated by Droy et al. [5], in the context of land tenure security in Madagascar, land decentralization should allow the transfer of competences to municipalities in land management, but, according to the information collected, this is not the case.

## 5. Conclusion

The study noted that the implementation of the 1998 Ivorian Rural Land Law is a social process and the product of institutions. Indeed, this institutional product depends on the perfect cooperation of social actors in relation sharing different interests. Better still, the formulation and award of certificates are linked to the configuration of institutional arenas, whether at the micro-institutional, meso-institutional or macro-institutional level. The hypothesis that institutional constraints impact the social motivation of populations is verified. The qualitative survey strongly mobilized in this study showed that there is a lack of coordination of the actions of the actors from each institution. There are gaps in the roles that each plays in securing land. Hence the incompleteness of the decentralization of the tasks that these actors must play. All this highlights the demotivation and resignation of the committee members or their low involvement in the certification of rural land in the locality studied.

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